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CRIMINAL COURT, NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Yablov'
(decided February 24, 2000)
Defendant Shiela Yablov was arrested for and charged with
aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of New
York Penal Law ("NYPL") § 240.30(1).2 The people subsequently
amended the charge to include harassment in the second degree, a
violation of NYPL Section 240.26(1). 3  Defendant moved to
dismiss challenging the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument.
She argued that the communication in issue did not meet the
requisite of the crime of harassment or aggravated harassment 4 and
therefore, the speech must be afforded the protections of both the
Federal5 and New York State Constitutions.6 The New York City
Criminal Court found defendant's actions not to be criminal within
the meaning of the penal statute because the speech was "too
1 183 Misc. 2d 880, 706 N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., New York County
2000).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1) (Mckinney 1999). This statute provides in
pertinent part:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second
degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm
another person, he or she: Communicates, or causes a
communication to be initiated by mechanical or electrical
means or otherwise, with a person, anonymously or otherwise,
by telephone, or by telegraph, mail, or any form of written
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or
alarm.
Id.
3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26(1) (Mckinney 1999). This statute proves in
pertinent part:
A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy alarm another person: He or she
strikes, shoves., kicks, or otherwise subjects such person to
physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same.
Id.
4 Yablov, 183 Misc. 2d at 881, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech. .... " Id.
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section provides in pertinent part: "Every citizen
may freely speak, write or publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
1
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vague to pose an immediate threat of physical harm.",7 Therefore,
defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument for
insufficiency to support the charge was granted.8
The complainant and defendant were involved in a
romantic relationship that ended in March of 1998. 9 Following
complainant's termination of the relationship, the defendant left "a
series of annoying, threatening, and unsolicited phone
communications" on the complainant's answering machine, over a
seven-month period. 10 The communications began in March 1998
and continued until August 1999.11
The complainant claimed that in March 1998, he received a
phone message from the defendant stating, "If I don't get the
money you make tomorrow I'll [sic] go to the next step. I have so
many irons in the fire, you don't know what.., is going on!
You'll be vulnerable and we'll get you!"' 2  In April 1998, the
complainant received another phone message from the defendant
stating, "Pay me or see me! I laid it right on the line for you!" 13
Furthermore, the complainant claimed that on July 25, 1999 the
defendant called the complainant's home at least twenty-two times
in a twelve hour period.'
In determining whether the defendant's speech constituted
harassment in the second degree or if it was protected speech under
the Federal and New York State Constitutions, the court looked to
the decision in People v. Dietz.15 In Dietz, the defendant was
charged with harassment after she confronted the complainant in
her doorway and called her a "bitch" and her son a "dog."' 6 She
also stated, that she would "beat the [sic] out of [the complainant]
some day or night out on the street.' 7 Although the court found
7 Yablov, 183 Misc. 2d at 888, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 596.




13 Yablov, 183 Misc. 2d at 883, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 593
14 Id.
5 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166,-550 N.Y.S.2d 595(1989).
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the words to be "abusive,"18 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the vulgar and offensive words were protected speech under
the New York State and Federal Constitutions.1 9 Speech may only
be forbidden or penalized if it manifests a fear in the individual of
immediate danger of severe harm.20  The court held that
defendant's words (lid not fall within the penal statute without any
acts or speech establishing a threat of immediate bodily harm.
21
Moreover, in People v. Todaro22 the defendant was charged
with harassment when he told an officer, "I'll get you for this,"
after being arrested.23 The New York Court of Appeals held that
words uttered in anno yance or anger are not enough to be
considered harassment.2 The Yablov court agreed and emphasized
that behavior that annoys another "is not enough to cause the actor
to suffer criminal sanctions." 25 The court reasoned that in a free
society a degree of rude, immature, annoying behavior will not be
condoned but, "the court will not criminalize behavior where to do
so would exceed the fair import of the statutory language defining
the offense of harassment." 6
In discussing the crime of aggravated harassment in the
second degree the court relied on People v. Price27 and People v.
Miguez.28 In Price, the defendant was convicted of aggravated
harassment in the second degree for sending a letter, to his attorney
'S Id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597. The court applied the
"common dictionary definition" of "abusive" as "course," "insulting and
"harsh." Id.
'9 Id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (citing Terminiello v.
Chicago, 33 U.S. 1, 4-5, which held that, "unless speech presents a clear and
present danger of some serious substantial evil, it may neither be penalized nor
forbidden").
20 id.
21 Id. at 47, 549 N.E.2d at 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598-599.
22 26 N.Y.2d 325, 258 N.E.2d at 712, 310 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1970).
23 Id .at 327, 258 N.E.2d at 712, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 305
24 id.
25 Yablov, 183 Misc. 2d at 885- 886, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 594 (citing People v.
Malausky, 127 Misc. 2d 84, 86, 485 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Rochester City Ct. 1985)).26 Id.
27 178 Misc. 2d 778, 683 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., New York County
1998).
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which stated, "I'm going through all this shit with you, you better
be careful, I won't be responsible if you talk to me like that
again.' 29 Later that day he communicated to the complainant that
"you will be ... sorry, you're playing with fire . ... 30 Two days
later, on the date and location stated in the letter defendant stated
to the complainant, "I'll get you," while "shaking his hand at
her." 31 The court held that the defendant's use of the mail to
communicate his threats and the content of the two
communications which included a date and location of the
threatened harm, "evince[d] an intention to harass, annoy, threaten
or alarm the complainant"
3
By contrast, in Miguez, the defendant repeatedly made
phone calls and pages to the complainant allegedly interfering with
complainant's medical practice.3 3 Similarly, the case involved the
termination of a romantic relationship. 34 Defendant was charged
with three counts of aggravated harassment for three separate
phone calls to the defendant on August 14, 1989, June 30, 1989,
and October 2, 1989. 35  The first count was based on the phone
call made on August 14, 1989 where the defendant spoke directly
to the complainant and stated, "[p]lease don't hurt me anymore,
[y]ou've hurt me enough, I still love you." 36 The second count was
based on the phone call made June 30, 1989, where defendant left
a message on the complainant's answering machine stating,
"[y]our girlfriend is a mean, ugly selfish [sic]. 37 The third count
was another message left on the complainant's answering machine
where defendant stated, Eddie I want to give you my number; even
if you don't call me, I want you to have it."38 The Yablov court




32 Id. at 781-82, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
33 Miguez, 147 Misc. 2d at 482, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
34 Id. at 483, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
31 Id at 483, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
361d.
37 Id.
38 Miguez, 147 Misc. 2d at 483, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
[Vol 17
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concluded that in the absence of a communication and a specific
threat, there was no aggravated harassment.
39
The Yablov court held that the statements made by the
defendant were ambiguous. No specific statement was ever
made which could be construed as an immediate threat of severe
harm.4 1 The phone calls did not "suggest a violence provoking or
substantial injury-inflicting utterance. ' 42 Moreover, she did not
state a time or place or what would happen to the complainant if
they ran into each other.43 Therefore, the court properly held that
the statements were too vague to pose an immediate threat of
physical harm to constitute harassment within the meaning of the
penal statute."44
The New York State Constitutional protections with respect
to freedom of speech parallel those of the Federal Constitution.
The Yablov court's analysis relied mostly upon the New York State
Constitution, but the outcome would have been the same under a
Federal analysis. ]Both the State and Federal Constitutions forbid
the government from passing any laws abridging the freedom of
speech. The Federal Constitution's protection extends to "speech
which does not present a clear and present danger, 4 5 while the
Court of Appeals., applying the New York State Constitution,
would void or reconstruct the language of NYPL § 240.25 and
similar statutes by "limiting its reach to constitutionally
proscribable fighting words," thus excluding any questions about
the vagueness and constitutionality of the statute. 6 However, the
New York Constitution goes a step further by including that
citizens are responsible for abusing that right and includes oral
written and published speech as protected. Freedom of speech is a
39 Yablov, 183 Misc. 2d at 886, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
4 Id. at 885, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
41 id.




4 Terminiello v. Chicago, 33 U.S. at 4-5.
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highly valued freedom in a free society but, it is not an absolute
freedom, as not all speech is protected.
Daniel Henthorne
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